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E.O. 12065: GDS (3/24/88) (BOSWORTH, S.W.)
 TAGS: CO, US
 SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE APPROVED POLICY
 PAPER:

I. U.S. INTERESTS

THE PRINCIPAL U.S. INTEREST IN COLOMBIA IS MAINTAINING THE GOC'S ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE ISSUES. THE SPECIAL VALUE OF SUCH COLOMBIAN SUPPORT STEMS FROM ITS CREDENTIALS AS A DEMOCRACY WITH A GOOD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. THE U.S. THEREFORE HAS AN IMPORTANT INTEREST IN HELPING COLOMBIA DEFEND ITS DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AGAINST VIOLENT OVERTHROW BY MARXIST EXTREMISTS. COLOMBIAN SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CUBAN/SOVIET-BACKED INSURGENCIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND

THE CARIBBEAN. WE SEEK COLOMBIAN ASSISTANCE IN ENCOURAGING DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN THAT AREA THROUGH PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY.

COLOMBIA'S LOCATION, PARTICULARLY ITS PROXIMITY TO THE PANAMA CANAL, CONTRIBUTES TO ITS INTEREST FOR THE U.S. A SECOND MAJOR U.S. INTEREST IN COLOMBIA IS THE CURTAILMENT OF THE PRODUCTION OF ILLICIT NARCOTICS AND THEIR EXPORT TO THE U.S.

THE THIRD MAJOR U.S. INTEREST IS A GROWING AND OPEN -OLOMBIAN ECONOMY WHICH FACILITATES INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND GREATER SOCIAL EQUITY; PERMITS A CONTINUED INCREASE IN U.S. EXPORTS, INCLUDING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS; AND CONTRIBUTES TO OVERALL GLOBAL ENERGY PRODUCTION THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF COAL AND PETROLEUM DEPOSITS.

II. BACKGROUND: SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CRITICAL

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PROBLEM AREAS**A. POLITICAL**

DESPITE ITS LONG HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, COLOMBIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM IS LABORING UNDER SUBSTANTIAL STRESS. WHILE CONGRESSIONAL (MARCH 14, 1982) AND PRESIDENTIAL (MAY 30, 1982) ELECTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO A PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER, THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY OVER THE NEXT TWO TO FIVE YEARS IS LESS CERTAIN.

A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE ELECTORATE HAS LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY'S TWO MAJOR PARTIES, LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE, SEEING THEM AS VIRTUALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE AND UNABLE TO SOLVE THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS. AN ACTIVE INSURGENCY COMPOSED OF A NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS IS EXPLOITING THIS DISSATISFACTION. THEIR NATIONALISTIC PRETENSIONS NOTWITHSTANDING, SOME OF THE GUERRILLAS HAVE RECEIVED IMPORTANT ASSISTANCE FROM CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION.

DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNIONS REMAIN IN THE MAJORITY BUT ARE BEING FAST OVERTAKEN BY THE AGGRESSIVE, WELL-HEELED COMMUNIST CONFEDERATIONS AND SEVERAL LARGE, INDEPENDENT, LEFTIST-RUN UNIONS.

THE SOCIAL/POLITICAL FABRIC OF THE COUNTRY IS FURTHER STRAINED BY THE GROWING ECONOMIC POWER OF THE NARCOTICS

TRAFFICKERS, AN INCREASE IN COMMON CRIME AND PERVERSIVE CORRUPTION.

AT THIS POINT ONE CAN NOT PREDICT WHETHER ANY OF THE THREE LEADING CONTENDERS FOR THE PRESIDENCY (LIBERAL: ALFONSO LOPEZ MICHELSEN, CONSERVATIVE: BELISARIO BETANCUR AND LIBERAL - DISSIDENT: LUIS CARLOS GALAN) HAS THE WILL AND THE POLITICAL STRENGTH NECESSARY TO REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PREVENT THE FURTHER EROSION OF DEMOCRACY.

B. SECURITY

TO DATE THE SEVERAL TERRORIST INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE NOT COME CLOSE TO THEIR GOAL OF OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT. DESPITE CUBAN ENCOURAGEMENT, THEY REMAIN DIVIDED, COOPERATING ONLY OCCASIONALLY. THUS FAR CUBA'S ASSISTANCE HAS LARGELY BEEN IN TRAINING AND MORAL SUPPORT, BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT IT IS ALSO FACILITATING ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE GUERRILLAS. GIVEN HAVANA'S OVERALL DESTABILIZATION EFFORTS IN THE AREA, CUBA WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE INSURGENTS, PARTICULARLY SINCE ITS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GOC HAVE ALREADY BEEN SUSPENDED.

THE INSURGENCY THREATENS COLOMBIA IN TWO WAYS. FIRST, IT POSES A CLEAR CHALLENGE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. THE ANARCHY ATTENDANT UPON THE KILLING, KIDNAPPING AND BANK ROBBERY WEAKENS THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE. SECOND, IF THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE INSURGENCY EMPLOYS MEASURES WHICH ARE PERCEIVED AS OVERLY HARSH AND WHICH IMPACT NEGATIVELY ON THE GENERAL POPULATION, AS MAY ALREADY BE OCCURRING IN SOME RURAL AREAS, IT WILL ALIENATE SOME POLITICAL SECTORS AND UNDERMINE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.

THE COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES REALIZE THAT, WHILE THEY CAN DEFEAT THE GUERRILLAS MILITARILY WHEN THEY ARE

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ABLE TO LOCATE THEM, A MILITARY RESPONSE ALONE WILL NOT SUFFICE. INCREASINGLY, MILITARY OFFICERS-ACCEPT THAT THE INSURGENCY IS FUELED BY THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SEE THE NEED FOR SOCIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM. AT THIS POINT, THE MILITARY SHOW NO INCLINATION TO DISPLACE THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD CHANGE IF THE SECURITY SITUATION DETERIORATED AND THE MILITARY CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS NOT BEING GIVEN SUFFICIENT REIN TO DO ITS JOB

OR IF THE GOVERNMENT TRIED TO REACH "TOO GENEROUS" AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE INSURGENTS, MOVED TOO FAR TO THE LEFT ON OTHER ISSUES OR PROVED INCAPABLE OF MANAGING THE ECONOMY EFFECTIVELY.

C. THE ECONOMY

-COLOMBIA IS IN A PERIOD OF RELATIVELY SLOW GROWTH DUE TO LOW COFFEE PRICES AND THE GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IS SHARPLY SKEWED, A SITUATION MADE EVEN WORSE BY THE CURRENTLY HIGH LEVEL OF UNDER/UNEMPLOYMENT (15/9 IN 1980).

THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (PIN) PROJECTS APPROXIMATELY US\$20 BILLION IN INVESTMENT (1980-1984) IN ENERGY, MINING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WHICH WILL HELP TO IMPROVE AGGREGATE ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES IN 1983-84. LONG TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS ARE PARTICULARLY GOOD IN THE ENERGY SECTOR, GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S RESERVES OF NATURAL GAS, POTENTIALLY HIGHER OIL AND MINERALS OUTPUT, INCREASED HYDROELECTRIC POWER AND THE START UP IN THE CERREJON COAL PROJECT. EXTERNAL FINANCING (ESTIMATED AT \$8.6 BILLION FOR 1981-85) FOR THE MAJOR PIN PROJECTS SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM DUE TO THE COUNTRY'S CREDIT-WORTHINESS AND HIGH LEVEL OF RESERVES.

D. NARCOTICS

NOTWITHSTANDING THE GOOD COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE U.S SINCE 1978, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN IMPRESSIVE SEIZURES, PROBABLY NO MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF NARCOTICS ORIGINATING IN COLOMBIA INTENDED FOR THE U.S. MARKET IS INTERDICTED. COLOMBIA CONTINUES TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT EXPORTER OF COCAINE, MARIHUANA AND ILLICIT PHARMACEUTICALS TO THE U.S. THE MODIFICATION OF THE PERCY AMENDMENT NOW REMOVES A MAJOR BARRIER TO PROMOTING THE USE OF HERBICIDES (PARAQUAT) TO ERADICATE MARIHUANA IN COLOMBIA. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER PRESIDENT TURBAY'S SUCCESSOR WILL AGREE TO A PARAQUAT ERADICATION PROGRAM.

THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A LINK BETWEEN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, ARMS DEALERS AND THE INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS. FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF THIS CONNECTION, COMBINED WITH INCREASING COLOMBIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH DRUG RELATED CRIME, COULD FORTIFY THE GOVERNMENT'S AND MILITARY'S RESOLVE TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING.

E. COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

UNDER PRESIDENT TURBAY, COLOMBIA HAS MOVED FROM A POSITION OF INDIFFERENCE ON ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECTING IT TO A WILLINGNESS TO SEE ITS INTERESTS IN MORE FAR REACHING TERMS. THERE HAS BEEN A PROGRESSIVE CONVERGENCE OF GOC AND U.S. VIEWS CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AREA. TWO FACTORS WHICH HAVE ENCOURAGED THIS CONVERGENCE AND FACILITATED EMBASSY/DEPARTMENT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP CLOSER COOPERATION WITH COLOMBIA WERE THE CUBAN SUPPORTED INVASION

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BY INSURGENTS IN EARLY 1981 AND U.S. RATIFICATION
OF THE QUITA SUENO TREATY.

MAINTENANCE OF THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE
NEXT COLOMBIAN PRESIDENT, WHO TAKES OFFICE IN AUGUST
1982, WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT. EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL
CANDIDATES APPARENTLY VIEWS THE CUBAN/SOVIET THREAT
WITH LESS ALARM AND MAY SEEK TO DISTINGUISH HIMSELF
FROM TURBAY. MOREOVER, THE NEXT PRESIDENT IS LIKELY
TO PURSUE A MORE CONVENTIONAL THIRD WORLD POSTURE.

III. LIKELY POLITICAL SCENARIOS

1. MUDDLING THROUGH (MOST LIKELY): OVER THE NEXT
FIVE YEARS, THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY
BE ABLE TO MANAGE THE COUNTRY'S
ECONOMIC/SOCIAL/POLITICAL/SECURITY PROBLEMS SO AS
TO PRESERVE THE AUTHORITY OF CIVILIAN RULE AND MAINTAIN
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. THE TEST OF THIS HYPOTHESIS
WILL BE WHETHER ITS ACTIONS ARE SUFFICIENT TO STAVE
OFF EITHER OF THE SCENARIOS DESCRIBED BELOW.

2. IN THE STYLE OF THE SOUTHERN CONE (POSSIBLE):
THE NEXT MOST LIKELY SCENARIO IS A MILITARY TAKE-
OVER PROMPTED BY A SEVERELY DETERIORATING SECURITY
SITUATION OR WIDESPREAD SOCIAL DISORDER. THIS COULD
BE REALIZED BY A COUP D'ETAT IN WHICH MILITARY OFFICERS
OUST THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES OR BY AN INCREMENTAL
INCREASE IN THE MILITARY'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE SECURITY AREA. THE USE OF
MILITARY COURTS TO TRY CIVILIANS ACCUSED OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.

THE MAJOR PROTECTION AGAINST THIS SCENARIO IS THE
COLOMBIAN MILITARY'S TRADITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN
CONTROL. THE PROVOCATION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBSTANTIAL
FOR THE MILITARY TO INCREASE THEIR POLITICAL ROLE
SIGNIFICANTLY.

3. APOCALYPSE (LEAST LIKELY): THIS SCENARIO ENVISAGES
A MAJOR UPSURGE IN INSURGENT/TERRORIST ACTIVITY,
IN WHICH THE UNIFIED GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS, TOGETHER
WITH RAPIDLY GROWING COMMUNIST DOMINATED LABOR UNIONS,
APPROACH THE POINT OF OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT.
FIGHTING WOULD BE WIDESPREAD, AND COLOMBIA WOULD,
FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, BE ENMESHED IN CIVIL
WAR. AN INSURGENT VICTORY IN EL SALVADOR OR ELSEWHERE
IN THE REGION WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS
IN OTHER STATES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING COLOMBIA.

IV. U.S. COURSES OF ACTION ASSUMPTIONS:

U.S. LEVERAGE IN COLOMBIA TO IMPROVE THE ODDS FAVORING
THE FIRST SCENARIO IS ONLY MARGINAL. THE GOVERNING
ELITE OF COLOMBIA IS SOPHISTICATED AND EXPERIENCED,
NOT READILY SUBJECT TO OUR INFLUENCE. EVEN IF ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE WERE CONSIDERED A USEFUL POLICY TOOL,
IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR COLOMBIA, SINCE
IT IS A MIDDLE-TIER COUNTRY, A GRADUATE OF U.S.
AID PROGRAMS. WE CAN BE RESPONSIVE, HOWEVER, ON
FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS, TRADE ISSUES AND MILITARY
ASSISTANCE REQUESTS.

IN THE POST-TURBAY PERIOD, THE U.S. CAN ATTEMPT
TO CONVINCE THE SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT THAT THERE
IS A FUNDAMENTAL CONVERGENCE OF U.S. AND COLOMBIAN
INTERESTS AND TO ELICIT ITS COOPERATION ON THAT
BASIS. AS NOTED ABOVE, THIS WILL BE DIFFICULT GIVEN
WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE THREE PRINCIPAL CANDIDATES

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FOR THE PRESIDENCY. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR INTEREST IN COLOMBIAN SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE CARIBBEAN BASIN REGION WILL PROBABLY INCREASE AS CUBAN/SOVIET EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE THE AREA INTENSIFY.

A. POLITICAL

TO PROMOTE COLOMBIAN SUPPORT FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:

- CONTINUE TO INVOLVE THE TURBAY GOVERNMENT IN CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE CBI, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY AND IN POLICIES CONCERNING THE SECURITY OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN REGION.
- CONTINUE TO SHARE WITH COLOMBIA U.S. INTELLIGENCE, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE CARIBBEAN BASIN REGION AND CUBAN/SOVIET EFFORTS TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY/TERRORISM IN THE HEMISPHERE.

TO IMPROVE U.S. INFLUENCE WITH AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE POST-TURBAY GOVERNMENT:

- THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE WINNER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND HIS KEY SUPPORTERS, ESPECIALLY ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN REGION AND APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH THEM.
- THE U.S. MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE TO REFINE ITS ANALYSIS OF THE CANDIDATES AND THEIR VIEWS ON ISSUES OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE U.S.
- SELECT A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL TO HEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE AUGUST PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION.
- ENSURE THAT THERE IS AN APPROPRIATE EXCHANGE OF HIGH LEVEL VISITORS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF THE NEW GOC.
- SCHEDULE A STATE VISIT FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT IN 1983.

TO ASSIST THE GOC IN PRESERVING THE COUNTRY'S DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS:

- INCREASE THE AIFLD BUDGET FOR ITS COLOMBIAN PROGRAM TO COUNTER GROWTH OF RADICAL LEFTIST INFLUENCE IN THE COLOMBIAN LABOR MOVEMENT.
- ENCOURAGE COLOMBIAN RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESPECIALLY IN ITS EFFORTS TO COMBAT INSURGENCY.

B. SECURITY

TO ASSIST THE GOC COMBAT INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM AND MAINTAIN ADEQUATE EXTERNAL DEFENSES:

- INCREASE MODERATELY U.S. FMS ASSISTANCE, PROVIDED THAT THE GOC INCREASES ITS OWN MILITARY EXPENDITURES SIGNIFICANTLY, WHICH ARE NOW ONLY 9.3 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET -- INSUFFICIENT GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY PROBLEM.
- CONSIDER FAVORABLY A GOC REQUEST TO PURCHASE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (WITHIN OUR ARMS TRANSFER POLICY) AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S AIR DEFENSES.
- ENCOURAGE MILITARY EXPENDITURES RELEVANT TO THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT.
- CONSIDER PROVIDING COUNTER TERRORISM TRAINING TO THE POLICE WHEN EXISTING LEGISLATIVE BARS ARE LIFTED.
- ENCOURAGE THE MILITARY TO INCREASE ITS EFFORTS IN CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS IN RURAL AREAS WHERE IT HAS A MAJOR PRESENCE COMBATTING THE INSURGENCY.

TO INCREASE U.S. INFLUENCE WITH THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS:

- INCREASE IMET FUNDS; ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION

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IN TRAINING PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD REINFORCE THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY'S TRADITION OF SUPPORT FOR CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- SENSITIZE THE MILITARY TO THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SUCCESS OF ITS ANTI-INSURGENCY EFFORTS AND TO OUR CONCERN THAT RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS SLIPPING.

-- PROMOTE INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND COLOMBIAN MILITARY AND CARRY ON A DIALOGUE CONCERNING REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES.

C. ECONOMIC

TO MINIMIZE FRICTION IN OUR ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE GOC:

-- INCREASE THE FREQUENCY OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOC ABOUT U.S. POLICIES WHICH IMPACT ON COLOMBIA, INCLUDING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES.

-- EXAMINE WHETHER THE U.S. TARIFF ON CUT FLOWERS IMPORTED FROM COLOMBIA CAN BE REDUCED.

-- MAINTAIN U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT AND CLOSE CONTACT WITH COLOMBIA ON COFFEE ISSUES.

-- ENCOURAGE THE GOC TO CONTINUE ITS MODERATE POSTURE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC FORUMS.

D. NARCOTICS CONTROL

TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS FROM COLOMBIA:

-- PROMOTE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOC FOR WIDESPREAD ERADICATION. WITHIN THE LIMITS OF AVAILABLE FUNDS AND SEEKING INCREASED GOC INPUT, INCREASE THE ALLOCATION FOR THE COLOMBIAN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM TO FUND MUTUALLY AGREED PROGRAMS.

-- INDEPENDENTLY AND IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOC, SENSITIZE THE COLOMBIAN PUBLIC ABOUT THE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND SECURITY DANGERS WHICH STEM FROM NARCOTICS PRODUCTION/TRAFFICKING AND THE NEED TO ATTACK THE PROBLEM WITH ERADICATION. IN SO DOING, WE MUST BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT, IN ADDITION TO MODIFYING THE PERCY AMENDMENT, ERADICATION IS BEING SERIOUSLY EMPLOYED IN THE U.S.

-- CONTINUE COOPERATION WITH THE GOC IN NARCOTICS INTERDICTION AND PROSECUTION OF MAJOR TRAFFICKERS IN THE U.S. AND COLOMBIA. HAIG
END OF MESSAGE

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